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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
CLD-243 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 11-1898 
 ___________ 
 
 DANIEL WOODS, 
Appellant 
 
 v. 
 
FIRST CORRECTIONAL MEDICAL INC.; CORRECTIONAL MEDICAL SERVICES 
INC.; L.P.N. LISA SUGAR; SHARI CAIN; R.N. JAMILLA MCKENZIE;  
NURSE VERIA MURPHY; RICHARD OKONIBO; JOHN DOE; JANE DOE;  
RONNIE MOORE, Health Services Administrator; INVESTIGATOR BRENDA 
LUCAS; JAMES T. VAUGHN CORRECTIONAL CENTER; DR. NIEZ; JOHN/JANE 
DOE DIRECTOR OF MEDICAL AT DCC 2007-2008 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the District of Delaware 
 (D.C. Civil No. 08-cv-00397) 
 District Judge:  Honorable Leonard P. Stark 
 ____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 
and for Possible Summary Action Under Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
July 21, 2011 
 Before:  RENDELL, FUENTES AND SMITH, Circuit Judges 
 
 (Opinion filed August 18, 2011) 
 _________ 
 
 OPINION 
 _________ 
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 Daniel Woods, a Delaware state prisoner incarcerated in the James T. Vaughn 
Correctional Center (“JTVCC”), appeals pro se from the order of the United States 
District Court for the District of Delaware granting Defendants’ motion for summary 
judgment.  For the following reasons, we will summarily affirm.        
I. 
 We write for the parties’ benefit and recite only the facts essential to our 
disposition.  In May 2007, after being diagnosed with Hepatitis C, Woods was referred to 
Dr. Lawrence McDonald, a former employee of Correctional Medical Services, Inc.’s 
(“CMS”),1 to initiate Interferon protocol to treat Woods’ condition.  Treatment consisted 
of Pegasys and Ribavirin injections.  Dr. McDonald also wrote orders for Woods to 
receive nutritional supplements throughout the course of his treatment.   
 Woods alleged that, despite Dr. McDonald’s directives, he was denied proper 
treatment by several CMS nurses.  Specifically, he claimed that they: 1) incorrectly 
administered his injections; 2) changed physician orders so that Woods did not receive 
his prescribed nutritional supplements; and 3) refused treatment, including necessary 
medication, on several occasions.  In June 2008, Woods filed a complaint in the District 
Court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the Defendants acted with deliberate 
indifference to his serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment.  Woods 
sought money damages.   
                                                 
1
 CMS was the medical services contract provider for the Delaware Department of 
Correction from July 2005 through June 2010.  Dr. McDonald was not named in the 
action. 
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 Several of the Defendants filed motions to dismiss, which the District Court 
granted because they were either immune from suit or had not been timely served with a 
copy of the complaint.  At the close of discovery, the remaining Defendants, which 
included CMS, Lisa Sugar, Robert Okinobo, Shari Cain, and Jamilla Mickenzie 
(collectively “the Medical Defendants”), filed a motion for summary judgment.  They 
also moved to strike a supplemental letter that Woods filed with the Court regarding a 
2006 investigation of five Delaware prison facilities.  Woods filed a cross-motion for 
summary judgment.  After reviewing the submissions, the District Court granted the 
Medical Defendants’ motions for summary judgment and to strike, and denied Woods’s 
motion for summary judgment.  Woods timely appealed.       
II. 
 We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review 
the District Court’s decision to grant a motion to dismiss de novo.  See Dique v. N.J. 
State Police, 603 F.3d 181, 188 (3d Cir. 2010).  We also exercise plenary review over the 
District Court’s entry of summary judgment, viewing the underlying facts and all 
reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.  See 
Ray v. Twp. of Warren, 626 F.3d 170, 173 (3d Cir. 2010).  After reviewing the record on 
appeal, we conclude that the District Court committed no reversible error in disposing of 
Woods’ claims. 
III. 
 As an initial matter, we conclude that the District Court correctly dismissed 
Defendants Ronnie Moore, Veria Murphy, Dr. Niez, John Doe, Jane Doe, John/Jane Doe 
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Director for Medical Services at DCC 2007 2008, and First Correctional Medical 
Services from the action because Woods failed to timely identify and/or serve those 
defendants with a copy of the complaint.   
 Defendants JVCC and Brenda Lucas were also properly dismissed from the action 
because Woods failed to state viable claims against them.  As to JVCC, under the 
Eleventh Amendment a Delaware state prison is immune from suit in federal court.  See 
Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 144 (1993).  
While states can waive their Eleventh Amendment immunity, see Koslow v. 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 302 F.3d 161, 168 (3d Cir. 2002), Delaware has not 
done so, see Green v. Howard R. Young Corr. Inst., 229 F.R.D. 99, 102 (D. Del. 2005) 
(Jordan, J.).  Accordingly, we agree that Woods’ section 1983 claims against the JVCC 
for monetary damages are barred. 
 With regard to Brenda Lucas, Woods alleged that she failed to act upon several of 
the administrative grievances that he filed.  Lucas was identified in the complaint as an 
investigator in several of Woods’ grievances.  We agree with the District Court that 
because a prisoner has no free-standing constitutional right to an effective grievance 
process, see Flick v. Alba, 932 F.2d 728, 729 (8th Cir. 1991), Woods cannot maintain a 
constitutional claim against Lucas based upon his perception that she ignored and/or 
failed to properly investigate his grievances.   
 Eighth Amendment Claims 
 The Eighth Amendment, through its prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment, 
mandates that prison officials not act with deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious 
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medical needs by denying or delaying medical care.  Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 
(1976).  In order to sustain a constitutional claim, a prisoner must make: 1) an “objective” 
showing that the prisoner’s medical needs were sufficiently serious; and 2) a “subjective” 
showing that the prison official acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind.  
Montgomery v. Pinchak, 294 F.3d 492, 499 (3d Cir. 2002).  “To act with deliberate 
indifference to serious medical needs is to recklessly disregard a substantial risk of 
serious harm.”  Giles v. Kearney, 571 F.3d 318, 330 (3d Cir. 2009). 
 Nutritional Supplements 
 Woods alleged that Defendant Shari Cain unilaterally changed Dr. McDonald’s 
orders regarding his dietary supplements.  The record reflects that, at various times, 
Woods was prescribed either Boost or Resource 2.0.  Woods claimed that around August 
2007, Cain unilaterally changed Dr. McDonald’s orders of two cans of Boost per day to 
one can per day of Resource 2.0.  However, Dr. McDonald is unequivocal that when the 
medical department switched supplements from Boost to Resource 2.0, he ordered that 
Woods be given only one can of Resource 2.0 per day.  Further, the record reflects that, 
on August 1, 2007, Cain entered a “clarification note” on Woods’ chart stating that Dr. 
McDonald had changed Woods’ order.  Woods presented no evidence demonstrating that 
Cain changed Dr. McDonald’s order and thus acted with deliberate indifference to his 
medical needs.  Therefore, we will affirm the District Court’s grant of summary judgment 
on this claim. 
 Failure to Treat 
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 Woods also alleged that Defendant Lisa Sugar refused to treat and assess his 
conditions at various times.  Specifically, he claimed that she did not adequately respond 
to several of his sick call complaints.  As an initial matter, Woods presented no evidence 
to suggest that Sugar was aware of all of his complaints.  In any event, the record reflects 
that Sugar provided Woods with treatment, both through regularly scheduled 
appointments and when she became apprised of Woods’ written requests for treatment.  
On one occasion, when Sugar attempted to treat Woods in his unit, but was unable to 
because he was in the shower, Sugar ordered another nurse to examine him, and later 
wrote Woods a prescription for his condition.  Based on the record, we agree with the 
District Court that a reasonable jury could not find that Sugar acted with deliberate 
indifference to Woods’ medical needs.   
Injections 
 Woods claimed that the Medical Defendants used incorrect needles to administer 
his injections, and that the syringes could not hold the proper dose of the medication.  
However, Woods does not dispute that he received sufficient doses of the medication, nor 
does he claim that his Hepatitis C treatment was unsuccessful.
2
  In addition, there is no 
record evidence to support his claim that incorrect syringes were used during the course 
of his treatment.  Therefore, a reasonable jury could not find for Woods on this issue. 
 Woods also claimed that because the Medical Defendants failed to rotate the site 
of his injections, he experienced nausea, sores, jaundice, dizziness, weakness, nose 
                                                 
2
 Dr. McDonald discharged Woods from the Hepatitis C Infectious Disease Clinic in July 
2009 because Woods’ viral load was undetectable in his blood work. 
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bleeds, and infections.  With the exception of the nose bleeds and infections, the 
conditions that Woods claimed to have suffered are known side-effects of Interferon 
treatment.  Woods acknowledged at his deposition that Dr. McDonald’s informed him 
about those possible side-effects.  And, although Dr. McDonald was not able to 
determine the cause of Woods’ nose-bleeds, he did not attribute them to the alleged 
failure to rotate the injection site.
3
  Woods did not present any information contradicting 
Dr. McDonald’s medical opinion.  Moreover, the record reflects that, when Woods raised 
the issue that the injection site was not rotated with sufficient frequency, steps were taken 
to remedy the problem.     
 Accordingly, we agree with the District Court that there is insufficient evidence 
upon which a jury could conclude that the Medical Defendants disregarded the risk to his 
safety during the administration of his injections.   
 State Law Claim 
 Lastly, we conclude that the District Court properly granted Defendants’ motion 
for summary judgment as to Woods’ state law claim of medical negligence.  Under 
Delaware state law, when a party alleges medical negligence, that party is required to 
produce an affidavit of merit, signed by an expert witness, when the complaint is filed.  
See 18 Del. C. § 6853.  The record reflects that Woods filed no such affidavit, nor did he 
timely move for an extension to do so.  Id.  
                                                 
3
 Dr. McDonald reached a similar conclusion regarding Woods’ infection, which Woods 
does not allege occurred at the site of any of his injections.  Although the record reflects 
that Woods was prescribed antibiotics at one point, it was because he had been diagnosed 
with sinusitis. 
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 For all of these reasons, we conclude that the District Court properly entered 
summary judgment in favor of the Medical Defendants.  We also conclude that the 
District Court properly granted the Medical Defendants’ motion to strike.  As mentioned, 
Woods asked the Court to consider a letter regarding the investigation of five Delaware 
prison facilities.  The investigation found substantial civil rights violations at several of 
those facilities and resulted in the entry of an agreement between the Department of 
Justice and State of Delaware.  However, the agreement clearly states that it may not be 
used as evidence of liability in any other legal proceeding.  Therefore, the District Court 
correctly declined to consider it as evidence in Woods’ case.4    
 As Woods’ appeal presents no substantial question, we will summarily affirm.  
See Third Cir. LAR 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.  Woods’ “Motion for Appointment of Counsel and 
Request to Reverse and Remand the Lower Court’s Ruling” is denied.  See Tabron, 6 
F.3d at 155-56.  Woods’ motion for default is also denied. 
                                                 
4
 To the extent that Woods also argues that the District Court improperly denied his 
requests to appoint counsel, because his claims were neither complex nor meritorious, the 
District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying his requests. See Tabron v. Grace, 6 
F.3d 147, 155-56 (3d Cir. 1993). 
